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CEO Presence on the Compensation Committee:
A Puzzle
Abstract
Conventional wisdom suggests that CEO membership of the compensation commit-
tee is an open invitation to rent extraction by self-serving executives. However, using
data from New Zealand – where CEO compensation committee membership is rel-
atively common – we find that annual pay increments for CEOs with this apparent
advantage averaged six percentage points less than those enjoyed by other CEOs
during the 1997–2005 period. After controlling for variation in firm performance, the
difference is a still-sizeable four percentage points. This puzzling result cannot be
explained by risk-return tradeoff considerations, interaction with other governance
variables, selection bias, or variable mis-measurement.
JEL classification: G34, J33
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CEO Presence on the Compensation Committee:
A Puzzle
1 Introduction
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) membership of the firm’s compensation committee would
seem to provide an ideal setting for opportunistic CEO behaviour. Even when such CEOs
are excluded from discussions relating to their own remuneration, committee membership
can still be advantageous: for example, by the negotiation of favorable pay structures and
packages for their subordinate executives – which then need to be passed on to CEOs
in order to maintain ‘relativity’. At the other end of the spectrum, CEOs who are not
part of the board of directors would appear to be in a relatively weak bargaining position
when it comes to negotiating their personal remuneration. In this paper, we ask whether
such extremes of CEO ‘influence’ on the pay-setting process are reflected in remuneration
outcomes. We find that they are, but not in the way intuition would suggest.
Precisely because of the bargaining-power imbalances they potentially create, situ-
ations where the CEO sits on the compensation committee, or is off the board altogether,
are extremely rare, at least in the United States (US). For example, Anderson and Bizjak
(2003), Klein (1998), Newman and Mozes (1999) and Vafeas (2003) all report a general
absence of CEOs from US firm compensation committees, while LeBlanc and Gillies (2005,
p92) claim that: “(i)t is almost unheard of for the chief executive officer of the corporation
not to be a member of the board of directors.”
Such homogeneity does not exist everywhere, however. One country where much
greater variation in CEO involvement occurs is New Zealand (NZ): in a sample of NZ
listed firms during the 1997–2005 period, approximately 1/3 appoint their CEO to the
compensation committee, while slightly fewer than 1/4 of CEOs are excluded from the
board altogether.
We find that this variation in CEO pay-setting involvement has an unexpected
outcome: after controlling for firm performance, CEO membership of the compensation
committee is associated with an approximately four percentage point reduction in average
annual pay growth. That is, CEOs with the most direct involvement in the setting of
their own remuneration are, on average, rewarded less generously than those who are
kept at arms-length. This puzzling result cannot be explained by mis-measurement of
CEO remuneration or board involvement, or a risk-return tradeoff by risk-averse CEOs,
or omitted governance variables, or selection considerations. Overall, these results present
a challenge to conventional wisdom about the link between governance structures and
CEO remuneration.
In the next section, we describe our data sources and properties. Section 3 con-
tains our results linking CEO pay outcomes to participation in the pay-setting process,
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while section 4 considers the impact of such participation on subsequent firm performance.
Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Data
Our initial sample consists of companies listed on the NZ Stock Exchange (NZX) between
1997 and 2005. We begin in 1997 because NZ firms were not required to disclose executive
compensation details prior to that time.1 Compensation and governance information come
from a hand-collected dataset obtained from company annual reports. Older reports were
obtained from the now-defunct Commerce Resource Library at Otago University; more
recent report information comes from the NZX Company Research database. Stock return
data, including adjustment factors, were sourced from the Otago University Sharemarket
Database, with supplementation from NZX. In each year, firms were excluded from the
sample if (i) there was missing information, (ii) they were only listed on the secondary
board, (iii) they delisted during the year, or (iv) the CEO was not in office for the entire
current and previous year. The final sample consists of 502 firm-year observations for
114 different NZX firms over the nine year period between 1997 and 2005. With 55 such
observations in 1997, this leaves 447 ‘first-difference’ observations over the sample period.
We focus on what Newman and Mozes (1999) call ‘firm-awarded’ compensation,
i.e., remuneration that is under the direct control of the firm. This has two components:
(i) salary, bonus and allowances, and (ii) new stock and option grants. NZ annual reports
directly provide, in a manner to be described below, data on the first component. They
also report information on any stock or option grants made during the year, which in
principle allows estimation of the second. However, stock and option awards occur infre-
quently in NZ firms during the sample period (11% of firm-years) and are of minor value
(approximately 6.4% of the value of component (i) for the firms where we are able to value
option grants). Moreover, 36 option grants in our sample (70% of those issued) are unable
to be valued due to insufficient information being reported. Given the low frequency and
limited importance of such grants in NZ, we avoid any further reduction in sample size by
henceforth confining our attention to component (i). We examine the importance of this
restriction in section 4.
NZ compensation disclosure requires that the sum of salary, bonus, superannuation,
health insurance coverage, and motor vehicle allowance be reported in the following ways.
For executives who are members of the board of directors, the exact value of this remu-
neration appears in a separate table of the annual report. For other employees, individual
details are not reported, only the number of workers receiving remuneration lying within
each $10,000 interval over and above $100,000 per annum. Consequently, we record com-
pensation for any CEO not on the board of directors as being equal to the midpoint of
1See Andjelkovic et al.(2002) for details of the legislative change and surrounding controversy.
2
Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for pay and performance mea-
sures from listed New Zealand firms between 1997 and 2005. Raw stock return is the annual
percentage change in firm value; market-adjusted stock return is raw stock return minus the re-
turn on the market index; annual compensation is the sum of salary, bonus, superannuation, health
insurance coverage, and motor vehicle allowance. The first column reports statistics based on all
firm-years appearing in the sample, while the remaining columns focus on three subsets: CEOs
who sit on the board of directors, but not the compensation committee, CEOs who sit on both
the board and the compensation committee, and CEOs who sit on neither.
All Firms CEO on CEO on CEO not
Board Compensation on Board
Committee
(N = 447) (N = 186) (N = 157) (N = 104)
Performance
Raw stock return 16.71 19.03 10.89 21.33
(%) (48.7) (44.8) (52.9) (48.3)
Market-adjusted 5.85 7.47 1.17 10.01
stock return (%) (45.5) (41.3) (50.2) (44.9)
Compensation
Annual CEO 439.23 534.98 388.81 344.10
compensation ($000) (318.2) (369.1) (280.0) (231.5)
Annual change in 11.34 14.72 8.60 9.42
CEO compensation (%) (22.2) (24.9) (20.9) (17.9)
the highest payment band.2 For example, if the CEO is not a member of the board of
directors and the maximum remuneration band in the annual report is $150,000-160,000,
then CEO compensation for that firm-year is estimated to be $155,000.3
For each firm–year, we collect performance and governance data. To proxy for
performance, we use the firm’s one-year market-adjusted stock return — the difference
between the firm’s stock return over the year and the aggregate stockmarket return (cal-
culated using the broad-based All Ordinaries Index).4 We also record the extent of the
CEO’s formal involvement in the pay-setting process: a member of the compensation
committee as well as the board (157 firm-years), a member of the board only (186), not a
board member (104). CEOs who sit on the compensation committee might be expected
to have a particularly strong influence on the compensation process, while those who are
excluded from the board may be in the opposite situation.
Some summary statistics for various pay and performance variables appear in Table
2Exceptions to this rule occasionally occur when when there are identifiable employees who receive
special retirement or redundancy payments that take them into the top band.
3All monetary values in this paper are expressed in NZ dollars. Inflation during the nine-year period
covered by our data averaged less than 2% per annum, so the difference between real and nominal values
is small. Re-estimating our models in real terms yields virtually identical results to those reported below.
4Because the relatively small and illiquid nature of NZ capital markets means that NZ firms may
reward factors other than stock market performance, we also used the firm’s one-year return on assets –
the ratio of after-tax profit to total assets – as a measure of performance. However, the results were very
similar to those appearing in the following tables and changed nothing of substance, so we do not include
them in the paper. They are, however, available from the authors on request.
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1. Across the whole sample, firms on average achieve an annual stock return of 17%, while
CEOs receive compensation that grows by 11.34% per annum. More interesting are the
differences between the three categories of formal CEO involvement in the pay-setting
process. CEOs who sit on the compensation committee receive the lowest annual growth
in compensation, but the firms they lead also perform significantly less well. At the other
end of the scale, CEOs who are not on the board lead the best-performing firms, but
receive relatively little reward for doing so.
Although these simple statistics suggest that variation in CEO board and compen-
sation committee involvement can influence CEO remuneration, they do not control for
differences in firm performance across the three levels of involvement. This is the task to
which we now turn.
3 A puzzling result
We regress annual CEO pay increments on firm performance and allow for different inter-
cept coefficients corresponding to the extent of direct CEO involvement in the pay-setting
process. Because NZ firms are relatively small, we estimate the pay-performance relation-
ship in elasticity form so as to counter the observed tendency for the dollar sensitivity to
decline with firm size – see, for example, Jensen and Murphy (1990), Gibbons and Murphy
(1992), and Schaefer (1998). Thus, we begin by estimating the simple model:5
∆Pay = α0 + α1R + α2DH + α3DL +  (1)
where:
∆Pay = annual change in the natural log of CEO pay;
R = annual firm performance, measured as excess stockmarket return (the
change in the natural log of (firm market value/stock market index));
DH = 1 if the CEO sits on the compensation committee and 0 otherwise;
DL = 1 if the the CEO does not sit on the board of directors and 0 otherwise.
Because some CEOs appear in the data multiple times we estimate robust standard errors
that allow for clustering at the firm level. We also include a full set of time dummies
(1998 being the excluded year). Our primary interest is in the estimates of α2 and α3 –
the incremental effects on CEO pay growth of compensation committee membership and
board exclusion respectively.
The results from estimating equation (1) appear in Column (1) of Table 2, and
reveal two intriguing phenomena. First, very little of the variation in pay growth of NZ
CEOs is attributable to variation in firm performance. Although statistically significant,
the estimate of α1 is economically small, especially when compared to those previously
5Although unreported, we also estimate models that include lagged values of R – see, for example, Hall
and Liebman (1998). However, this leaves the principal results below unaffected.
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Table 2: CEO Influence and Pay: Basic Regressions
The dependent variable is the annual change in the natural logarithm of CEO pay. Firm
performance is the annual change in the natural logarithm of firm value minus the annual
change in the natural logarithm of the stock market index. Ex-officio membership of the
compensation committee arises when the CEO attends committee meetings without being a
member. All regressions include a full set of year dummies (1998 being the omitted year) and
are based on 447 firm-year observations. Terms in parentheses are robust standard errors




Firm performance 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029)
CEO on Compensation Committee −0.039∗∗
(0.018)
CEO not on Board of Directors −0.040∗∗ −0.039∗∗
(0.019) (0.020)




obtained elsewhere. For example, three representative US-based studies that estimate the
elasticity form of the pay-stockmarket performance sensitivity – Murphy (1985), Hall and
Liebman (1998) and Zhou (1999) – report estimates ranging from 0.16 to 0.23, two to three
times the NZ value. This suggests that NZ CEO remuneration is, on average, relatively well
insulated from fluctuations in firm performance. Second, and most strikingly, the estimate
of α2 is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. Specifically, after controlling
for variation in firm performance, CEO membership of the compensation committee is
associated with annual pay growth that is approximately four percentage points lower
than that enjoyed by CEOs who sit only on the board. Just as surprisingly, this ‘penalty’ is
almost identical to that associated with not being on the board at all (α3). Quantitatively,
the CEO of the average-performing firm in our sample receives an annual pay increment
of 13.5% if he has board membership, but this falls to 9.5% if he isn’t a board member,
or to 9.6% if he is a board member who also sits on the compensation committee – a
monetary difference of just under $20,000.6
One possible objection to this puzzling finding is that some CEOs may exert influ-
ence over the compensation committee even when they are not members, resulting in a
misclassification of those CEOs. If these CEOs are highly paid, then our estimate of the
6From Table 1, the average firm-year performance is 5.85%, so the estimated pay growth from column
(1) of Table 2 is 0.131 + 0.076∗0.0585 = 0.135 if the CEO is on the board but not the compensation
committee, and 0.131 + 0.076∗0.0585− 0.039 = 0.096 if on the compensation committee as well.
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‘penalty’ for compensation committee membership is overstated. To address this potential
problem, we search company annual reports for evidence of ‘ex-officio’ CEO membership of
the compensation committee. This typically shows up in the form of a footnote statement
along the following lines: “while (CEO name) is not a member of the compensation com-
mittee, he attended these committee meetings in his capacity as CEO”. For every firm-year
where this occurs, we re-classify it as a CEO who has compensation committee member-
ship, resulting in 19 additional observations in that category (with 11 and 8 respectively
fewer in the board-only and not-on-board categories). We re-estimate equation (1) using
this alternative measure of compensation committee membership and report the results
in column (2) of Table 2. However, this only exacerbates the puzzle – the compensation
committee penalty is now slightly larger and is more precisely estimated.
4 How robust is the puzzle?
The result that compensation committee membership is associated with less generous CEO
pay increases is surprising and counter-intuitive. In this section, we consider some obvious
explanations for this puzzle.
4.1 Omitted governance variables
One possibility is that our CEO board-involvement categorization is inadvertently picking
up other more fundamental governance features, thus resulting in a spurious relationship
between pay increases and compensation committee membership. To investigate this pos-
sibility, we employ three governance variables identified by Core et al. (1999) as being
potentially important determinants of CEO pay – board size (the number of directors),
independent director representation (the proportion of directors who are independent),
and CEO-Chair duality.7 We re-estimate equation (1) including these three variables and
report the results in column (1) of Table 3. Although greater board size is weakly asso-
ciated with higher pay growth, the inclusion of the governance variables has no effect on
our estimate of α2 – CEO membership of the compensation committee remains associated
with annual pay growth that is approximately four percentage points lower than that
enjoyed by other CEOs. If anything, the puzzle is exacerbated by the inclusion of the
governance variables since the α3 estimate is now statistically indistinguishable from zero,
implying that CEOs who sit on the compensation committee are rewarded less generously
even than those who are excluded from the board altogether.
7See Core et al. (1999) for a discussion of the economic link between these variables and CEO pay.
Boyle and Ji (2011) provide some historical summary statistics for these variables in NZ firms over the
period covered by our data.
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Table 3: CEO Influence and Pay: Governance, Risk and Selection
The dependent variable is the annual change in the natural logarithm of CEO pay. Board Size
is the number of directors on the board; Independent Directors is the proportion of directors
who are independent; CEO-Chair = 1 if the CEO is also the board chair and 0 otherwise.
Column (3) is the second stage of a two stage procedure in which the first stage accounts for
possible selection effects in the board role of the CEO: Lambda is the selection parameter
for CEO compensation committee membership and Gamma is the selection parameter for
CEOs who are not members of the board. All regressions include a full set of year dummies
(1998 being the omitted year) and are based on 447 observations. Terms in parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗(∗∗)(∗) denotes significance at the .01
(.05) (.10) level.
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.196∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.019) (0.061)
Firm performance 0.080∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.026) (0.033) (0.031)
CEO on Compensation Committee −0.039∗∗ −0.042∗∗ −0.232∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.104)








Firm performance * CEO −0.074
on Compensation Committee (0.062))
Firm performance * CEO −0.057





R2 0.07 0.06 0.06
F-statistic 2.42∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
4.2 Risk-return tradeoff
Another possible explanation for the puzzle is that the lower pay growth associated with
CEO membership of the compensation committee reflects a risk-return tradeoff by risk-
averse CEOs. Specifically, CEOs who sit on the compensation committee may use their
‘power’ to negotiate a low-risk, low-return remuneration package. According to this story,
the negative estimate of α2 is simply the price risk-averse CEOs pay in order to reduce
their compensation risk.
To test this story, we re-estimate equation (1) including two additional variables
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that interact firm performance with DH and DL respectively. However, as can be seen
in column (2) of Table 3, neither interaction variable is even close to being statistically
significant, while the estimate of α2 actually rises slightly. The puzzle does not, therefore,
appear to be the result of risk-return considerations by risk-averse CEOs.
4.3 Selection
A third possibility is that the ‘selection’ of CEOs who sit on the compensation committee
is not random. For example, CEOs who expect their future pay growth to be constrained
– for whatever reason – may actively seek compensation committee membership in order
to best minimize the pain. According to this view, the negative estimate of α2 reflects
self-selection by CEOs (and/or the firms that employ them).
To investigate this idea, we employ the Campa and Kedia (2002) implementation of
the two-stage Heckman (1979) procedure. The first stage estimates probit models of the
decisions to (i) include the CEO on the compensation committee and (ii) to exclude the
CEO from the board. The results of these models are used to estimate selection param-
eters (corresponding to each of the two decisions) which are then included as additional
explanatory variables in equation (1).8
The results of this exercise appear in column (3) of Table 3. Allowing for selection
makes the puzzle worse: the coefficient on the compensation committee selection variable
is positive rather than negative, suggesting that firm characteristics which encourage CEO
membership of the compensation committee also tend to encourage high pay growth. As
a result, the estimate of α2 becomes even more negative.9
4.4 Cash versus total compensation
Finally, we consider the possibility that our results are at least partly an artifact of our
focus on cash, as opposed to total, compensation. It could be, for example, that CEOs who
sit on the compensation committee are giving up some cash remuneration in exchange for
stock options of greater value. In this case, compensation committee membership would
indeed be associated with lower cash remuneration, but there would be no puzzle.
As discussed in section 2, we are unable to test this idea directly by using total
compensation growth as an alternative dependent variable in equation (1). However, we
can get some idea of its plausibility by comparing the frequency of option awards across
the three CEO ‘involvement’ categories. Such a comparison turns out to be revealing: of
the 51 option grants made during our sample period, 13 are to CEOs who serve on the
compensation committee, 36 are to CEOs who sit on the board only, and 2 are to non-
8The explanatory variables used in the first-stage probit models are firm performance, firm sales, and
firm risk – as measured by the standard deviation of monthly firm stock returns for the five-year period
ending the last day of the previous fiscal year.
9We also estimate models that include combinations of the variables introduced in the various columns
of Table 3, but this has no effect on the puzzle.
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board CEOs. Relative to the total numbers of observations (see Table 1), these correspond
to 8.3%, 19.3% and 1.9% respectively of firm-years in the three categories. Given that
CEOs who are not members of the compensation committee receive option grants at more
than twice the rate of CEOs who are members, it seems unlikely that our focus on cash
compensation is responsible for the puzzle.
5 Concluding Remarks
Much has been written about executive compensation, but surprisingly little is known
about how this is affected by formal CEO involvement in the executive pay-setting pro-
cess. At one extreme, CEO membership of the rms compensation committee would seem
to represent a significant departure from the arms-length bargaining model envisaged by
agency theory, and hence create the potential for opportunistic CEO behaviour. At the
other, CEOs who are not part of the board of directors would appear to be in a relatively
weak bargaining position when it comes to negotiating their personal remuneration. We
examine this issue using data from New Zealand, where there exists considerable variation
in the extent of formal CEO involvement. After controlling for variation in firm perfor-
mance, we find, surprisingly, that annual pay increments for CEOs with compensation
committee membership averaged four percentage points less than those enjoyed by other
CEOs during the 1997–2005 period. Moreover, this unexpected outcome cannot be ex-
plained by some obvious candidates – risk-return tradeoff considerations, interaction with
other governance variables, selection bias, or variable mis-measurement – and so represents
something of a puzzle.
Although the last decade, in particular, has seen a significant number of well-
documented cases of seemingly-excessive CEO compensation, the evidence in this paper
indicates that, at least in NZ, such cases are unlikely to arise as the result of CEO member-
ship of the compensation committee. If anything, our results suggest that highly-visible
arrangements which, on the surface, appear an open invitation for CEOs to behave op-
portunistically, may in fact induce them to exercise greater restraint.
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